Historic ages

It is conventional to divide prehistory into stone, bronze and iron ages.

In modern times, this scheme is attributed to Christian Jürgensen Thomsen (G 2072-5, 1788-1865). He recognised the pattern while classifying objects for the National Museum of Denmark.

However, the Roman poet Lucretius (Titus Lucretius Carus, c. G 1997-8, c. 99-55 BC), in his scientific poem On the nature of things, wrote that humans first used stone for their tools, then copper and finally iron (Book 5, lines 1281-1296). Lucretius's reference to copper can be taken as shorthand for bronze (which is 90 percent copper).

Before Lucretius, the Greek poet Hesiod (c. G 1970, 750 BC) described five ages, in the following order: gold, silver, bronze, heroes, and iron. Here, the age of heroes stands out as not being named after a metal. It seems to refer to what, in modern reckoning, would be the late bronze age/early iron age, a time of warfare and social breakdown in the Greek peninsula. As for gold and silver, Lucretius also noted that people were using these metals in what for him was the copper age, but he said they preferred copper because it could be worked more easily than the two precious metals.

These three basic ages -- stone, bronze and iron -- have been further divided and refined in various ways.

The stone age, for example, is divided into the old stone age (palaeolithic) and the new stone age (neolithic), while the old stone age is itself divided into the upper, middle and lower palaeolithic (with the upper being the most recent part). Between the stone and bronze ages is recognised to be a copper age, known as the chalcolithic or eneolithic.

Terminology varies between the archaeological traditions of different regions. For example, in African archaeology, the upper/middle/lower palaeolithic tend to be called the late/middle/early stone age. Meanwhile, in Europe there is recognised a mesolithic between the palaeolithic and neolithic; although 'mesolithic' literally translates as 'middle stone age', this is not the same as the African middle stone age, which refers to the middle part of the palaeolithic. In some regions outside Europe, the equivalent of the mesolithic is called the epipalaeolithic.

The history of fully modern humans begins with the upper palaeolithic (or whichever term is preferred in other regions, e.g. late stone age in Africa).

What age are we in today?

We continue to use iron. The contents of the average cutlery drawer, for example, are generally made of iron (or more precisely steel, which is over 95 percent iron and has been the predominant form of iron since antiquity). On the other hand, we have introduced a variety of other materials to replace iron in various applications -- notably plastics, which future archaeologists will no doubt find clogging up excavations dating from our period. So this could be the plastics age. Alternatively, some suggestions pick out other features of our time, labelling this the space age or the information age.

To understand the significance of these 'ages', there are two facts we need to consider:

1. The 'ages' started and ended at different times in different places. In south-west Asia (Iraq), the start of the bronze age was around G 1840 (c. 4000 BC), while in western Europe it was around G 1920 (c. 2000 BC).


2. The technologies were not confined to the ages named after them, but could first appear well beforehand and continued in use long afterwards. For example, iron was already known about in the bronze age, and, during the iron age, bronze continued to be favoured for some items, such as statuary and clothes pins. Similarly, particular stone tool types (lithic modes) are known sporadically from times long before they came into widespread use, and stone tools continued to be made into the bronze age.

Taking the second point first, it is clear that the discovery of the technology did not in itself turn it into a prominent part of everyday life. Phasing out one technology and phasing in the next only occurred after a lengthy delay.

The reason for this is that the whole of society revolved around these fundamental technologies. It was not a question of putting down one type of tool and picking up another. The entire political, economic and social structure had to be rearranged.

Consider the change from stone to bronze.

• (Economic issues) Late stone age people did not generally make their own axes - they were produced by specialists and were traded, sometimes over hundreds of miles. Obviously, the end users had to provide something in return, and so particular goods would flow back towards the makers of the axes. What represented a fair and feasible exchange for a given type of axe would have become established through experience. The end-users and axe-makers did not necessarily meet face-to-face but the axes may have passed through the hands of one or more intermediate traders, who not only saved everyone a long journey but may have played a useful role in swapping the goods the end-users had to offer for other goods more desirable to the axe-makers. To shift from stone to bronze, this network had to be dismantled and a new one constructed - one that now linked the end-users with the people and places where bronze was produced. This represented a problem for the stone axe-makers and for the stone axe-traders. New traders had to set themselves up, and the types and quantities of goods to be exchanged for bronze axes had to be worked out. So this technological shift required all involved to adjust their livelihoods and make contact with different parties, while some (the stone traders) were likely to lose out as others gained.


• (Political issues) Bronze weapons were far more effective than stone weapons. So unless stone age chiefs were quick to get the new technology they were apt to find themselves being overpowered by new warlords, perhaps people they had once dominated but who by luck or judgement got bronze before they did. Not only did vagaries in the obtaining of bronze affect the balance of power, but the superior qualities of bronze allowed warlords to project their authority over much larger areas than before, though that would not be achieved without a fight.


• (Social issues) Stone tools were not just utilitarian objects. They had a place in ritual and religion. This is apparent both from the appearance in burial mounds of stone axes that were clearly ceremonial objects, too good for everyday use, and from studies of contemporary stone-using societies. The shift to bronze thus required a transformation of religious thinking or more generally of cultural ideas and practices. In his classic essay Steel Axes for Stone Age Australians, the anthropologist Lauriston Sharp described how, among Australia's Yir Yoront aborigines, only senior men knew how to make stone axes, and this allowed them to maintain their authority over women and junior men, who had to borrow an axe from a senior man whenever they needed one. However, missionary workers gave the aborigines steel axes, without preferring senior men over the others - indeed senior men avoided the missionaries and tended to lose out in the distribution of steel axes. This removed the basis of the senior men's authority and led to a breakdown in the aborigines' whole social order. Similar social transformations may have been triggered by the switch from stone to bronze.

Thanks to the above issues, there was much inertia or resistance to the historical change from stone to bronze. Not only were the adjustments going to be painful but people had little way of knowing whether it would be worthwhile in the long run. So they avoided going down that route in the first place.

Nevertheless, experimentation continued in the background, and the properties and possibilities of bronze became increasingly familiar until it could no longer be resisted. When the changeover occurred it was inevitably rapid. It was not possible to combine some aspects of stone-based society with some aspects of bronze-based society, because the two were fundamentally incompatible. These were distinct eigenmodes and people had to switch from one to the other wholesale.

The switchover was, however, heavily contested. There was war, impoverishment and cultural disruption as the ambitions of those who stood to gain from bronze clashed with the fears of those who stood to lose out, while trading networks collapsed and relations between members of society were fundamentally renegotiated.

In short, the stone-bronze transition was accompanied by a dark age, when the political, economic and social institutions of the stone age were broken down to make way for the building of new political, economic and social institutions more suited to the conditions of the bronze age. This is in accordance with the phoenix principle.

What is true of the stone-bronze transition is true of other transitions. They were also brought about via dark ages. Within the stone age, it is possible to detect dark ages mediating the transitions to mesolithic and neolithic society. And this is also what lies behind Hesiod's identification of an 'age of heroes' between the bronze and iron ages. The age of heroes was a time of violence and warrior culture, when kings and armies thrashed out a new geopolitical landscape for the iron age, and learned how to organise and fight with their new weapons.

We can now return to the first point, i.e. that technological change occurred thousands of years earlier in some places than in others.

The traditional view would be that new technology just took a long time to diffuse say from the middle east to northern Europe, and that this would be evidence of the lack of contact between ancient societies.

We now see that the delay has nothing to do with societal contacts or the flow of ideas. In fact, ancient societies were in frequent contact, and information took just years, not thousands of years, to get from one place to another. The problem was that societies needed to undergo vast political, economic and social changes if they were to exploit the information that was coming through. It was the sheer magnitude of the changes, not the difficulty of communication, that slowed down technological uptake.

It is the same as in Africa today. Africa is exposed to advanced industrial technologies almost as soon as they come into use elsewhere, but Africa is nonetheless finding it difficult to transform itself politically, economically and socially so as to incorporate the technologies fully into its way of life.

It is not only underdeveloped societies that may find it hard to transform. Sometimes societies lag behind precisely because they are already successful and have little incentive to change.

At the time of the bronze age, Egypt lumbered on, not taking up the bronze technology that was making great headway among the fragmented city states of Mesopotamia. Egyptian society was already highly adaptive and its vested interests were powerful enough to fend off changes that might challenge their social position. In a similar way, mighty and monolithic China lagged behind as the fragmented polities of Europe made great technological advances in the eighteenth to twentieth centuries. Both Egypt and China suffered because of their conservatism, though both eventually accelerated into the new technological era.

Thinking about history in terms of technological ages therefore has both good and bad points:

• It is 'good' in that the various technologies genuinely stand for distinctive configurations of social institutions, which, because of their mutual incompatibility, changed wholesale from one to the other.
• It is 'bad' in that the emphasis on technology may fail to convey the important point that these ages involved far-reaching political, economic and social, not just technological, transformations.

As labels for major societal eigenmodes, the stone-bronze-iron ages, with their subdivisions, are too convenient to give up. We just have to remember that they are a shorthand for what were ultimately sociological rather than technological revolutions.

Nevertheless, the difficulty of deciding whether we are still in the iron age or, if not, what age we should call this, indicates that the age concept is not abstract and generalised enough to cover ongoing technical and societal change. We need something more formal and theoretical.

Such an improved measure is a society's total technology complement or inventory. Rather than using just one technology to stand for the total way of life of a society, we can consider all the technologies that the society incorporates into its way of life -- i.e. not just 'bronze', say, but weaving, needlework, pottery, roof-thatching, bow-making, net-making etc.

The 'inventory' concept provides a more nuanced characterisation of technological change than the blunt division into stone/bronze/iron ages. It allows for finer gradations of technological level and it can be immediately generalised to current and future technological levels. We do not need to argue about whether this should be called the space age or the plastics age; we merely tot up the total inventory of modern technologies. Unlike the 'age' concept, the 'inventory' concept also decouples technology from an explicit dependence on time, and this is more consistent with the fact that technological advances do not occur everywhere simultaneously, even among societies that are in contact.

I will return to a more detailed discussion of inventory in a later post. The main purpose of this post has been to get a handle on the significance of technological ages -- i.e. that they are good rules of thumb, which have some theoretical justification behind them.

Summary - understanding social complexity

I want to summarise the points I have been making in the last half dozen posts.

When we look around the world, we see societies of varying sophistication.

We should not put this down to some societies being more 'talented'. It is a matter of scale and eigenmodes.

The question is, why scale increased in some places and not others.

We should not think that increasing scale is an obvious 'choice'. People actually like to get away from each other. And the simple, free lifestyle of low-scale societies holds many attractions.

That said, people are contradictory. Population concentrations can be attractive, offering possibilities not found in the free-roaming band, especially as far as young people are concerned. Once established, high scale may be self-sustaining.

Why there are three eigenmodes

I previously introduced the family, village and city-level eigenmodes of society. What differentiates these societies is the relative probability of meeting friends, acquaintances and strangers.

• At the family-level people deal almost exclusively with friends. Encounters with people that could be regarded as acquaintances or strangers are rare.
• At the village-level people, if not friends, are at least acquaintances. Encounters with strangers from outside the village are rare.
• At the city-level people, most people are mutual strangers and encounters with strangers are normal.

Since even in the city people have acquaintances and friends, the village and family are actually subsets of the city eigenmode. People who live in city-level societies also belong to village-level and family-level societies. (This need not be a literal village; the 'village' may consist of a neighbourhood or a group of co-workers in a company.) Similarly, people in village-level societies also routinely experience the family-level.

The relationship between scale and the different eigenmodes can be attributed to the fact that maintaining acquaintanceships and especially friendships requires an investment of time, yet people's time is limited. If they encounter thousands of people over the course of a year, they cannot really be acquaintances let alone friends of all of them.

The number of friends a person may have is from about ten to about fifty (remembering that 'friends' in the technical sense includes close relatives). The number of acquaintances may be from about a hundred up to about a thousand. All other relationships are strangerships.

As the society's scale (interactions per unit time) changes, the proportion of friendships, acquaintanceships and strangerships changes as shown in the following figure.

• When scale is very low and people spend all their time with say ten others, all relationships will be friendships. Friendships=100%, acquaintanceships=0%, strangerships=0%.
• As scale increases and people each maintain say a hundred relationships, ten of those relationships will be friendships and the other ninety acquaintanceships. Friendships=10%, acquaintanceships=90%, strangerships=0%.
• As scale increases further and people each maintain say a thousand relationships, ten of those will be friendships, a hundred acquaintanceships, and the other 890 strangerships. Friendships=1%, acquaintanceships=10%, strangerships=89%.

Thus, as scale varies, one passes from a friendship-dominated society to an acquaintanceship-dominated and then strangership-dominated society. Since friends, acquaintances and strangers behave towards each other in different ways, the type of relationship that dominates a society determines the type of behaviour that is characteristic of that society.

Friends, acquaintances, strangers, and the three dimensions of society

Friends, acquaintances and strangers behave differently with respect to the three dimensions of society.

These differences are summarised in the following table and explained below.

	Friends	Acquaintances	Strangers
Political	Equality	Prestige	Domination
Economic	Sharing	Credit	Exchange
Social	Personal contact	Community	Abstraction

Friends

• Political dimension. This scarcely exists. Among friends there are no power relations. Some may be respected and listened to in particular situations, but none are allowed to put themselves above others. There is equality.
• Economic dimension. There is no concept of debt or of the exact measuring out of how to pay someone back for a service they have provided. Instead, there is an attitude of share-and-share-alike. Everybody pools what they have and all get equal benefit from the common stock. This has been called 'primitive communism'. In sum, there is sharing.
• Social dimension. People know each other on the most intimate terms, often as close relatives or at least as very close friends. Their loyalty to each other is based on this direct emotional bond. What connects the members of the group is personal contact.

Acquaintances

• Political dimension. This is relatively weak, but certain people have influence over others, obtained through the force of their personality. They must work hard to keep up their authority over networks of clients whom they place under their obligation either with material support or by brokering activities on their behalf. It is their personal qualities and activities that cause them to be listened to. The ability to determine the behaviour of others is based on prestige.
• Economic dimension. People trust each other and do not demand immediate repayment for goods or services that they might have supplied. Nevertheless, there is a requirement that exact repayment should be made in the long run. People who have been given help owe something to those who helped them. The system of exchange is based on a concept of credit.
• Social dimension. People know each other by sight. Even if they are not friends directly, they are connected through others. They share a way of life down to every detail of language, dress and custom. They call the same general area home. They participate in the same festivals and public activities. There is a sense of community.

Strangers

• Political dimension. Some people have power over others, based not on personal charisma but on the threat of force. There is a pyramid or hierarchy of power and power-holders are supported by the rest of the hierarchy, so that power can be assigned to the very young or old or others who could not secure it on their own behalf. Since the hierarchy mobilises to protect itself and imposes its will rather than merely exerting influence, power is experienced as domination.
• Economic dimension. People are not prepared to give credit to those they cannot be sure of meeting ever again. When they give each other services they require immediate satisfaction in the form of a counter-service of equivalent value, and they expect nothing further in future. Every transaction comprises a balanced and completed exchange.
• Social dimension. People do not necessarily share things in common. They may dress differently, speak differently, behave differently. Their sense of home may be different. In so far as they feel part of one group it is by acknowledge loyalty to a flag, a figurehead, a nation or some other abstraction.

Friends, acquaintances and strangers

Hunter-gatherer or family-level societies are characterised by sharing and egalitarianism.
This means that...

• Sharing: people readily lend or give away food and possessions, and, instead of precise reckoning of debts, there is a general expectation of give and take. This does not mean that people are always happy to share. They can find it a burden. Fred Myers, who studied the Australian Pintupi tribe, once lost his temper when he ran out of cigarettes because the aborigines had cadged them off him. One of his aborigine contacts advised him to hide his cigarettes in his sock and pretend that he did not have any next time he was asked, saying "that is what I do".
• Egalitarianism: there are no definite leaders and those who try to dominate are shunned or mocked. Richard Lee, who studied the Kalahari San, once tried to thank his hosts by giving them an ox to feast on. Instead of showing gratitude, they teased him, saying what a measly ox it was. In this way they prevented the appearance of any feelings of superiority/inferiority caused by his obviously greater wealth as a western anthropologist.

Anthropologists have contrasted such attitudes with the selfish and hierarchical nature of 'developed', or high-scale, societies, where shopkeepers do not share food with their customers and where politicians exercise power over other people's lives.

A moment's thought reveals, however, that members of high-scale societies behave like hunter-gatherers when it comes to those closest to them. Inside the household, there is sharing and equality: shopkeepers are not mercenary at home, nor do politicians lord it over their family in the way they show their authority in public.

The selfishness and hierarchy that seem typical of high-scale societies are characteristic of how people deal with strangers. It is just that, among hunter-gatherers, meetings with strangers are rare. Nevertheless, when they do have to deal with strangers, hunter-gatherers do not go in for their normal casual sharing. For example, they conduct trade with other groups, and, although this can take on what to us are unfamiliar forms (owing to communication barriers, lack of a medium of exchange, and mutual suspicion/hostility), it boils down to immediate and balanced exchange just like trade in high-scale societies.

Therefore, rather than hunter-gatherers and citizens of 'developed' societies having fundamentally different attitudes to sharing/not-sharing, they can be regarded as having exactly the same attitudes. The difference is in the amount of time they spend dealing with strangers versus friends and relatives.

How one person acts towards another depends on two factors:

• Intimacy: whether the person is only happy if the other person is happy
• Trust: whether the person expects to meet the other person again

These factors combine to produce three different types of relationship:

Relationship	Intimacy	Trust
Friendship	Yes	Yes
Acquaintanceship	No	Yes
Strangership	No	No

Some comments on this model:

• A 'person' is not necessarily an individual human being, but can be any legal or corporate 'person' such as a business firm or a nation state.
• The terms introduced above have the technical meanings given to them, not their natural meanings in informal, everyday language. For instance, a mother would be considered her son's friend in the above technical sense though probably not in the everyday sense. Similarly, a person's bank would be that person's acquaintance in the technical sense, in that there is an expectation of meeting again (they have each other's address) = trust.
• The above table leaves out a fourth possible relationship, involving intimacy but no trust. One might think that such a relationship would never occur and that intimacy would always involve trust. However, this relationship is seen when people give charity towards those they do not know and do not expect to see again. A classic example is that of desert tribespeople accepting unfamiliar travellers into the camp and giving them food, water and shelter. The hosts do not expect direct recompense, but they do expect indirect recompense through being treated similarly when they are travelling and in need of refreshment. I will not make much use of this relationship.

Scale

In characterising the three basic eigenmodes, an important factor was the size of the community. I argued, for instance, that a small group of hunter-gatherers could not support the social complexity of a large city.

However, it can be difficult to define the size of the community.

• Although the San split into groups of about a dozen adults most of the time, they come together in bands of fifty or more for festivals or rabbit drives.
• A city like New York not only belongs to a larger nation, but need not have clear-cut boundaries and includes people who commute in and out during the day.

The important issue is people's ability to interact. The point about the city is that people come into contact with perhaps thousands of people over the course of a year, so that they can access all sorts of specialist services and find enough customers for their own specialist skills.

This is captured by the concept of scale:

The scale of a society is the number of distinct persons with whom a member of that society interacts in a given time.

The advantage of this definition is that we do not need to worry about how to draw the boundaries of the society.

Some theories (e.g. A W Johnson and T Earle The evolution of human societies) talk in terms of population density. However, it is not just the number of people per square mile that is important, but their ability to interact with each other, and this can be affected by transport and communications improvements, which bring people into contact without them necessarily living closer together physically.

The scale concept properly captures the importance of the community's size and density along with people's ability to move and communicate.

Emil Durkheim called this dynamic density.

'Interaction' should be interpreted in a very general sense. It does not just mean interaction with people we know.

• A fleeting encounter with someone serving in a shop is an interaction.
• Someone reading a plumber's advertisement in the yellow pages can be an interaction, since there is a flow of information from the plumber to the reader.

A society's scale is the key to its eigenmode (figures in brackets below represent scale in terms of the number of distinct persons encountered per year).

• Low scale (10s of persons) -> family mode
• Medium scale (100s of persons) -> village mode
• High scale (1000s of persons) -> city mode

Although scale is closely connected with eigenmode, it would be wrong to say the society's scale causes its eigenmode. Scale is an aspect of the eigenmode. We should not think of it as coming first, even though we might want to. It is not productive to think in terms of cause-and-effect but instead we should think in terms of interdependency.

With the definition of scale given above, the comparison between two societies depends on the timescale used.

• If we take scale as the number of distinct persons encountered per day, then it might be around 10 for both a hunter-gatherer and a New Yorker, but if we take scale as the number of distinct persons encountered per year, then it might still be around 10 for the hunter-gatherer but in the 1000s or even more for the New Yorker. In other words, if we use a day as the time interval, the scales of the two societies seem similar, but if we use a year they seem very different.

Although we could adopt say a year, which gives a reasonably realistic result, as the standard time span, it would be preferable to have a measure of scale that does not depend on time span.

Let Z_ij(t) be the amount of time that the i^th member of the society spends interacting with the j^th member of the society during a period of time of length t. Define z_ij by

z_ij represents the proportion of time, taken over the long term, for which this member of the society interacts with the j^th other member. The society's scale from the perspective of this member is then given by

The society's overall scale, S, is the mean of the scales from the perspective of each member. If N is the number of persons in the society:

With this measure, some possible scale calculations are as follows (these are simplified illustrations and are not meant to be fully realistic):

Family of 10 persons; people divide their time equally between the other members.	Scale = 1
Village of 1000 persons; people spend much time within a close family group of 10 members and encounter other members of the village one tenth as often.	Scale = 2.9
City of 100,000 persons; people spend much time within a close family group of 10 members, encounter a wider circle of 1000 colleagues one tenth as often, and encounter the remaining citizens one thousandth as often.	Scale = 4.2

Calculations in the above table use base-10 logarithms. This is not important; using other bases will change the absolute but not the relative values.

Three great eigenmodes

Societies have existed so far in three basic eigenmodes. (Some might argue for a fourth eigenmode; see below.)

I have described two of these eigenmodes already: hunter-gatherers such as the San, and cities such as New York. The third eigenmode is intermediate between these two. It consists of societies whose members grow their own food and live in isolated settlements with no formal governmental structures.

Let us characterise these eigenmodes more closely...

Family-level	Example: San Size of typical community: 10 people Political mechanisms: Egalitarian; no formal leaders (elders may be respected). Those who try to 'act big' are mocked and resented. Friction/conflict is resolved by one party moving away to join friends, relatives or in-laws in another group (or by violence). Economic mechanisms: Foraging (living off the land); nomadic; very simple equipment. Philosophy of share-and-share alike. Intricate customs give members rights to specific parts of the day's catch. Those who do not 'pull their weight' are subject to teasing and gossip, but there is no explicit reckoning of debits and credits. Social identity: Each family-level group considers itself part of a tribe of several hundred people, coming together a few times per year.
Village-level	Example: New Guinea highlands Size of typical community: 1000 people Political mechanisms: 'Big men' attain prestige through ability, hard work, accumulating wealth and careful cultivation of social networks. They wield influence not formal power. Disputes lead to feuds, where a man allies with his brother against his cousin, and with his cousin against a more distant relative. Big men or priests mediate to break the spiral of violence. Economic mechanisms: People farm/garden. They help each other, e.g. in harvesting/housebuilding, but debts must be repaid (perhaps many years later). Elaborate displays of generosity gain prestige. People are self-sufficient and specialisation is rudimentary. Social identity: Kinship (degree of relatedness) dictates people's obligations and behaviour towards each other.
City-level	Example: New York Size of typical community: 100,000+ people Political mechanisms: Leaders exert formal power, promulgating laws and enforcing them via police and law courts. The position of leader and the hierarchy of officials are permanent, though the individuals fulfilling these roles may change. Economic mechanisms: People are specialists and must exchange with others to obtain the necessities and luxuries of life. These exchanges are commercial transactions, in which there is an explicit and immediate balancing of value. The political authority demands a share of economic output (tax), to spend on public goods like defence, roads and social security. Social identity: People can be themselves; this contrasts with other modes, where everyone knows everyone else's business, family and background.

If you brought some ancient Romans to modern New York and asked them to buy a bottle of win in a shop, then, apart from the language issue, they would understand exactly what was involved. They would be familiar with shops and money. They would also recognise other aspects of the city such as street signs, public and private buildings, and even wheeled vehicles (though they might be surprised at these being self-propelled).

By contrast, if you brought to New York some people who had lived all their lives in an isolated New Guinea village and asked them to buy wine in a shop, they would have little idea what you were talking about. They would find the whole environment of the city unfamiliar and bewildering.

(Nevertheless, a New Guinea highlander might be at home with particular pieces of technology, such as a transistor radio, where the Roman would not have a clue, so this is not an issue of mental capacity.)

This reflects the fact that the ancient Romans, though they lived two millennia ago, were in the same social eigenmode as modern city-dwellers, whereas the inhabitants of a 21st century village cut off in the highlands of New Guinea, are in a different eigenmode.

Some might say that there should be an intermediate eigenmode, that of the 'chiefdom', between the village and the city. A chief's authority is more permanent and formal than that of the village big man, but less formal than that of a city government. For example, the chief collects tribute, unlike a big man, but this falls short of a proper taxation system. However...

• While the chiefdom is indeed distinctive, the existence of three basic eigenmodes can nevertheless be accounted for by factors that I will explain shortly (in another post). I therefore prefer to see chiefdoms as eigenmode "2½" (with the village as 2 and the city as 3).
• Although there are three basic eigenmodes, there may be many variations on them. A Roman city has its basic features in common with a modern city, but in detail obviously there are differences. Both are eigenmodes in the sense of being self-consistent solutions to the problems of social living. However, in comparison with Rome, the modern city solves the problems with more extensive economic specialisation, more effective policing, higher population density, and a greater ratio of urban to rural population.

It remains a valid question whether there can be a fourth eigenmode beyond the three outlined above, i.e. one that has not yet been realised. I believe the answer may be yes, but I need to discuss other things before I can talk about this properly.

Eigenmodes

In my last post I talked about the lifestyles of New Yorkers or San hunter-gatherers as being each a self-consistent solution to the problems of social living.

I call such a self-consistent way of life a social eigenmode.

'Eigen', from the German, means 'characteristic'. An eigenmode is therefore a characteristic mode of social living, i.e. one that is feasible/allowable as opposed to impossible/inconsistent. (This use of the prefix is derived from mathematics. An eigenvector of a matrix is a vector whose direction does not change after multiplication by that matrix; in this sense the vector is characteristic of the matrix.)

Let us put this symbolically.

Suppose a society's way of life (mode) is designated by M, which includes technology, population density, customs and everything else that describes how the society's members live.

Such a society is then exposed to the problems of social living, e.g. obtaining sustenance, caring for the young, resolving disputes and so on. These problems challenge or 'act on' the society's mode of existence. Let us represent this by P(M).

If the society's way of life is not a successful solution to the problems of social living, the society will necessarily change to a different way of life, say to M'. Let us write this as P(M) -> M'. If M' also does not solve the problems, the society will need to change again, say to M''. I.e. P(M') -> M''.

A social eigenmode is a value of M that satisfies the equation P(M) -> M. A mode that satisfies this equation is one that solves the problems of social living and does not need to change in response to those problems.

An eigenmode is therefore an attractor of the operator P(). [At least, if the operator P() has attractors, they will be eigenmodes.] What this means is that any given mode of existence will evolve, under repeated exposure to the problems of social life, towards one of the allowable and self-consistent eigenmodes successfully solving those problems, and there it will stay.

Societies and self-consistency

The Namibian government was recently criticised for its treatment of the San or Bushman people, hunter-gatherers living in the Kalahari Desert. It had forced them to leave the desert and give up their traditional lifestyle. According to the government, this was so that the San would undergo development and become part of mainstream Namibian society. The San and their supporters said that the government's real motive was to facilitate exploitation of the desert's mineral resources. A court case found in favour of the San, although the dispute will no doubt go on.

Kalahari San (Bushman)

There is a tendency to think of people like the Kalahari San, whose way of life is essentially that of the Upper Paleolithic, as cases of arrested development. It seems as though their society, unlike our own, has failed to progress. They appear to be living fossils, hangovers from the stone age. It may even be thought that the dark-skinned San lack the intellectual resources of the white races, whose technological civilisation now dominates the planet.

Such ideas need to be put aside...

• On the racial issue, the Sami, or Lapps, of Norway and Sweden are fair-skinned, have been hunter-gatherers in modern times and remain so, in part, to this day.
• Rather than being a hangover from the stone age, the San may have taken to their way of life in the Kalahari only a few centuries ago, fleeing from slaveraiders and European colonists.
• The San are just as keen and capable at dealing with modern technology as people belonging to western society. And the average person in western society had no more involvement in developing advanced technology than did the Bushman in the following picture.

San hunter with GPS device

Nineteenth and early twentieth century anthropologists thought in terms of a ladder of social evolution. At the bottom were 'savages' like the San. Next came 'barbarians', who farmed rather than hunted for their food but were otherwise self-sufficient with a simple lifestyle. Above these were 'chiefdoms', and finally 'states' or 'civilisations', with formal governmental structures and complex economies. Societies were presumed to progress through the successive stages.

It might be thought that this website has a similar view of 'progress'. In an earlier post I showed history as a graph of upward movement towards ever higher Kardashev levels. It is true that I consider human destiny to be mastery of the universe, and since we started from nothing there has to be a process of growth or development to get from here to there. However, we are not 'better' or 'cleverer' than stone age people (past or present). Different ways of life are sensible and successful solutions to the circumstances in which people find themselves, while the dynamic that propels societies from one to the other has a rationale of its own--it is not simply the piling up of inventions by particular brilliant individuals. We should not confuse societies with the people that live in them. The greater complexity of some societies can no more be attributed to them being composed of more capable human beings than the greater complexity of some biological organisms can be attributed to them being composed of more capable molecules.

The way of life of the San and other hunter-gatherers has a logic to it...

• Since they live off the land, the San must form small, widely-spaced groups and move regularly in pursuit of food. Most of the time, they separate into bands of no more than ten adults and roam territories hundreds of miles across over the course of a year. The San could not live in a group of 100,000 people because such a group would instantly devour any patch of berries or colony of rabbits it came across. A city-sized community of hunter-gatherers would have to move impossibly far and impossibly often in order to support itself.
• Meanwhile, since the San live in such small groups, their way of life has to be very simple. Think about all the expertise and labour that goes into building a car, or setting up a GPS network. An isolated group of ten people, however capable or intelligent, could never undertake projects of this kind. To have, say, a motor industry you need a large number of people, with some mining the raw materials, others designing and assembling the product, and still others growing the food to keep everyone alive.
• Finally, since they move around so much and carry everything with them, the San's way of life again has to be very simple. Instead of transporting a drinking beaker everywhere, for example, it is easier just to cup your hands.

Therefore, San communities must be small and mobile because they live simply. And the San must live simply because their communities are small and mobile. The two things go hand in hand.

Contrast this with the situation of New York...

• A huge, settled population like that of New York cannot live directly off the land. It has to have an elaborate economy. It needs a large number of specialists doing and making the things without which New York could not function--food retailing, plumbing, building, policing... At the same time, all the complex things that go on in New York, such as stockbroking or providing an underground train service, require the co-operation of a large, dense population.

So New York's large size goes hand in hand with its technological complexity, just as the small size of San groups goes hand in hand with their simplicity.

You cannot mix and match the characteristics of the two lifestyles.

The San lifestyle is incompatible with, say, advanced plumbing, just as the New York lifestyle is incompatible with the lack of advanced plumbing.

If for some reason New York's economy were dismantled and the population were forced to become self-sufficient hunter-gatherers, life in the city would become intolerable. The inhabitants would quickly flee the city and spread across the landscape in search of food. It would not be long before they were back to the San way of life.

Rather than thinking in terms of backwardness and advancement, we might see the San and New York lifestyles as alternative, self-consistent solutions to the problems of social living.

When we look at the San lifestyle, we should not regard it as indicating a failure of intellect or imagination but should recognise it as one of the possible ways that humans may live, whose simplicity is one of its inevitable and essential characteristics.

It might be objected that the San's lack of movement towards a more complex, 'civilised' eigenmode is a kind of backwardness. However...

• Since the San reject the town-life that the Namibian government wants to force on them and have campaigned to go back to the desert, it is clear that they prefer their desert lifestyle. They enjoy hunting and gathering, which gives them all the food they need, for a few hours work a day, while in the desert they are freer than they would be in civilised society, where they would have to obey laws and pay taxes.
• The complex lifestyle of civilisation can be seen as something that was forced on people when hunting and gathering became untenable, rather than as a product of greater cleverness. Civilised people are not necessarily better off than the San. Many still idealise and hanker for the simple, self-sufficient life. Hunting, for example, is often the prerogative of a privileged elite, while gathering, such as blackberrying, may be done for pleasure.

My main aim in this post has been to introduce the idea that all the features of a particular way of life fit together in a logical manner. As a subsidiary point, I have wanted to challenge the notion that social sophistication should be put down to the greater inventiveness of certain races accumulating over time. Rather than ranking societies on a ladder of progress, we will understand them better if we approach and explore them as individually self-consistent systems.